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GRADUAL RETIREMENT: PREFERENCES AND LIMITATIONS
BY
TUNGA KANTARCI∗, ARTHUR VAN SOEST∗∗
Summary
In the traditional retirement scenario, individuals work full-time or part-time until a given age,
and then stop working abruptly. From the individual’s point of view, it seems more attractive to
have a smooth transition, with gradual retirement. In Sweden and other European countries, spe-
cific gradual retirement programs have been created in the past 20 years, first in combination with
early retirement programs and later to increase labour market participation of older workers. This
paper surveys the existing literature on gradual retirement in the US and Europe and analyzes the
relevance of gradual retirement in the Netherlands as a tool to keep people employed longer.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In the traditional retirement scenario, individuals work full-time or part-time
until a given age, and then stop working overnight. This fits with the notion
of an institutionalized life course with separate stages of labour force prep-
aration, participation and withdrawal (Kohli 1986; Meyer 1986; Mayer and
Schoepflin 1989). Labour market rigidities in terms of team production, fixed
employment costs and social security incentives or age discrimination are fac-
tors that appear to have contributed to this segregation (Mayer and Mu¨ller
1986; Hurd 1996; Quinn 1981).
It seems intuitively attractive from the point of view of the individual, how-
ever, to have a smooth transition from work to retirement, gradually reduc-
ing the number of hours worked. This is also in line with a more recent view
on the life-course trajectory: Bru¨eckner and Mayer (2005) contended that the
post-modern epoch identifies “patterns of a greater variety of partly freely
chosen, partly imposed life trajectories.” Opportunities for gradual reduction
of the working effort may also increase opportunities for working after the
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normal retirement age: many people dislike the idea of continuing the same
job with the same effort after this age, but may well be interested in contin-
ued participation in the labour market at a reduced effort level.
Gradual withdrawal from the labour force can have two forms (see, e.g.,
Scott 2004): either phased retirement (reducing work hours in the same job)
or partial retirement (changing to a less demanding job with usually fewer
hours and lower earnings). Each retirement path comes with its own income
trajectories before, during, and after the transition process, with, for example,
a combination of wages and a partial state pension and/or occupational pen-
sion during the period of gradual retirement.
In the United States, about 18% of the cohort of salaried workers born
between 1931 and 1941 were in phased or partial retirement in 1998 and 2000
(Scott 2004). In Europe, several gradual retirement programs have been cre-
ated in the past 20 years, first in combination with early retirement programs
and later as an attempt to increase the participation rate of the older part
of the workforce. In the Netherlands in 2004, about one-third of former and
current employees said their (last) employer offered the possibility of phased
retirement (Van Soest et al. 2006).
In order to design successful plans that are attractive to older workers,
increasing their lifetime welfare, well-being, and contribution to society, it
is essential to know the preferences of the workers as well as the consider-
ations of their employers for offering or not offering gradual retirement. It
is also essential to know the constraints imposed by state and occupational
pension schemes. Institutional restrictions on combining earnings with pen-
sion income, or a pension system in which the pension level is determined by
final earnings have been shown to severely limit the attractiveness of phased
or partial retirement in the US (Chen and Scott 2003).
The relevance of this topic for society and public policy seems obvious.
Early retirement programmes and other exit routes that lead to early with-
drawal from the labour market imply a burden for the macro-economy, mag-
nified by the ageing of the population, and are therefore at the top of the
policy agenda in many countries. Gradual retirement has the potential to
improve the lifetime utility of older workers while at the same time increasing
labour supply and the sustainability of the pension system. A central issue is
the ambiguous effect on total hours worked. Some workers who choose part-
time work would otherwise have retired completely, but others would have
kept working full-time. The total effect on labour supply depends on which
of the two effects is larger.
This paper first surveys the existing micro-economic literature on grad-
ual retirement. It discusses concepts, measurement and prevalence of grad-
ual retirement. It then discusses worker preferences (supply), advantages and
disadvantages for employers (demand), and institutional constraints. For an
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international perspective, the paper considers gradual retirement in both the
US and a number of European countries.
The paper also specifically looks at the Dutch situation and the relevance
of gradual retirement as a tool to keep people longer at work. Increasing
the participation rate to 80% in 2016 is an explicit target of the Dutch gov-
ernment and the unions and employers’ associations. While the rise in par-
ticipation of prime age women has resulted in a rise in the overall partic-
ipation rate in the past decades, this rise now seems to have come to a
standstill (see Sect. 6), leaving increasing participation of the elderly as the
main alternative. Gradual retirement may be an important tool to make
this feasible.
In addition to the literature review, which gives insight in worker pref-
erences, our paper analyses new survey data on the perceptions of Dutch
employees of opportunities for gradual retirement at their current employer.
Combining these with findings on preferences gives an indication of what is
needed to increase the prevalence of gradual retirement and the participation
rate of older workers.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 considers definitions and
measurement issues. Section 3 describes the factors facilitating and obstruct-
ing gradual reduction of the work effort from the standpoint of both the
employee and the employer, looking at theoretical arguments as well as sur-
vey evidence. Section 4 focuses on the empirical facts for the US, considering
transitions into and out of gradual retirement, and discussing the correlates
of gradual retirement identified in the literature. Section 5 looks at gradual
retirement in Europe. Section 6 looks specifically at preferences for and access
to gradual retirement in the Netherlands. Section 7 concludes.
2 CONCEPTS AND MEASUREMENT
Traditional retirement is characterized by a structural break in the late life
cycle – from full employment to complete retirement. In contrast, gradual
retirement involves a time period during which work activity is reduced,
implying a transition process rather than an instantaneous transition (Quinn
1999). The transition into retirement may take various forms (Hayward et
al. 1994). The reduction of work can imply a reduction of working hours,
hourly wages, or both, in- or outside the career job. Transitions are not
always monotonic (from working more to working less), but may be revers-
ible with, e.g., re-entry into a non-career job after spending some time outside
the labour market (Hayward et al. 1994). The literature uses a wide range of
indicators to identify gradual retirement. These include a reduction in work-
ing hours or earnings with an accompanying partial-pension benefit, a change
in employer at age 55 or over (implying resignation from the career job), or a
subjective qualitative assessment in the form of a self-report. Some measures
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also combine hours or earnings changes with self-reports (Ruhm 1990; Scott
2004), or wages with working hours (Honig 1985).
Gradual, phased, partial and part-time retirement are all different terms
used in this context. In this review gradual retirement is used as a generic
term to define a gradual withdrawal from the labour market by reducing work
effort. Phased retirement is progressive retirement while keeping the same
employer within the same system, while partial retirement involves a change
in employer.1
Phased retirement therefore does not involve change of employer. Exam-
ples include downsized work schedules, temporary assignments, consulting
work, telecommuting, leave of absence and job-sharing (Reday-Mulvey 1995;
Flahaven 2002; Chen and Scott 2003). Partial retirement, on the other
hand, involves a change of employer or a shift into self-employment, accom-
panied by a reduction in working hours or the wage rate (or both) (Gustman
and Steinmeier 1983, 1984b, 1986; Honig and Hanoch 1985; Scott 2004).
Another term that is often used in this context is Part-time retirement,
defined as at most 34 working hours per week by the US Bureau of Labor
Statistics, or as fewer than 1600 h per year (Quinn 1999), and involves a lower
wage. It does not necessarily involve a change of job. A bridge job is defined
as a change from the career job (with more than 10 years of tenure) to a new
(usually less demanding) job or self-employment (Ruhm 1990; Quinn 1996).
Phased and partial retirement are often discussed in relation to flexible retire-
ment, which refers to flexibility in choosing the retirement age, but in the con-
text of an abrupt end to labour force participation (Latulippe and Turner
2000).
Measurement of gradual retirement draws upon the observed or stated
labour market status. The former is a quantitative, objective realization of an
event such as a reduction in weekly or annual working hours, a reduction in
earnings, a change away from the life-long job, or receipt of a partial pen-
sion. The latter is based upon a qualitative, subjective assessment by a sur-
vey respondent. Surveys often ask the respondents to characterize their job,
labour market position or job transition. Numerous objective and subjective
measures of gradual retirement have been used in the literature. We briefly
discuss them below.
2.1 Working Hours
A reduction of working hours is an indication of gradual retirement, although
in some cases, the reduction may not be the choice of the worker (Ruhm
1 The existing literature is not consistent in the use of terminology. For example, partial
retirement is often used instead of phased retirement (Gustman 1985; Honig 1985; Honig and
Hanoch 1985; Ruhm 1990).
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1990). Several thresholds have been used to define part-time work and part-
time retirement. The US Bureau of Labor Statistics’ measure for a part-
time job is at most 34 h per week. Empirical results appear insensitive to the
thresholds (e.g., Blau 1994). Others have defined part-time work on an annual
basis. For example, Haider and Loughran (2001) and Scott (2004) used less
than 1,750 – 35 h for 50weeks. A rationale to use annual hours is that part-
time work may appear as a reduction in weeks per year rather than in hours
per week (Quinn 1999).
2.2 Wage Rates
Partial retirement typically also involves a transition to a job with a lower
wage rate and often has no pension coverage (Gordon and Blinder 1980;
Gustman and Steinmeier 1982; Ghent and Clark 2001). Quinn (1999)’s sam-
ple of US workers aged 51–65 in 1992–1996 reported a range of wage rates
from $ 5 to $10 for 60% of the bridge jobs, but only for 33% of the career
jobs. However, phased retirement can also be associated with a lower wage
(Gustman and Steinmeier 1982, 1984a).
2.3 Earnings
As a combination of the hourly wage rate and hours worked, earnings provide
an attractive measure of gradual retirement. Gustman and Steinmeier (1984b,
2000) defined gradual retirement as a more than 40% decline in both hours
worked and earnings. In data from the early seventies, the peaks in the rel-
ative earnings – the ratio of current earnings to maximum earnings – distri-
butions by age and year suggest an alternative threshold of 50% (Honig and
Hanoch 1985).
2.4 Pension Receipt
For private pension plans, a partial-pension receipt is an alternative measure
of phased retirement. The percentage of the pension that is received is usu-
ally the same as the reduction in working hours (an individual reducing work
hours by 30% would thus receive 30% of the pension benefits in phased retire-
ment) (Latulippe and Turner 2000; Brown 2005). This measure is less useful
in the US and several other countries, however, where gradual retirees usually
do not have pension coverage (Ruhm 1990; Honig and Hanoch 1985).
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2.5 Subjective Self-reports of Labour Market Status and Retirement
Transitions
Self-reports have the advantage that they do not require researchers to make
arbitrary distinctions between, for example, part-time and full-time work
hours. Self-reports also preclude erroneous classification of individuals as par-
tially retired due to involuntary reductions in wages, job demotion or dis-
placement (Ruhm 1990; Chen and Scott 2006), and avoid problems due to
missing data on hours, weeks or wage levels required to determine the retire-
ment status (Gustman and Steinmeier 1984a, 1986). A problem with stated
gradual retirement can be its inconsistency with objective measurements. For
example, respondents report that they are in gradual retirement but have
observed earnings at or near previous levels or have not held a job for a sub-
stantial amount of time before the survey (Honig and Hanoch 1985; Gustman
and Steinmeier 1986). Quinn (1981) compared the subjective account of par-
tial retirement to objective measures, such as labour force status and annual
hours worked and concludes that the self-evaluation is generally consistent
with the quantitative indicators (see also Gustman and Steinmeier 1984b), but
the opposite has also been argued (Murray 1979; Ruhm 1991). Some studies
define gradual retirement by supplementing subjective with objective measures
on hours (Scott 2004) or earnings (Ruhm 1990).
3 OBSTACLES AND BENEFITS
3.1 Obstacles
As explained by Scott (2004), the fact that in the US phased retirement is
less common than partial retirement suggests that workers face restrictions on
phased retirement and often have to find a new job if they want to reduce
their work effort. Many restrictions have been suggested in the literature, but
there is not much empirical evidence on their quantitative importance.
Hurd (1996) summarized a number of reasons why employers are often
reluctant to create opportunities for phased or partial retirement. The first is
fixed employer costs, which can be overcome only if the number of working
hours is substantial, unless hourly wages are reduced. This may sometimes be
possible, but not always (e.g. due to agreements with unions). Another type of
restriction is production technology and team production and the difficulty of
job scheduling in case of part-time jobs. The third is that reducing hours may
make it more difficult to retain job-specific skills (cf., e.g., Morris and Mallier
2003). Investment in on-the-job training is less attractive to the employer for
older workers than for younger workers, since workers approaching retire-
ment will not stay with the firm long enough to make the investment pay off.
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This also may explain why some employers are reluctant to hire older workers
for jobs that require investing in on-the-job skills.
Gustman and Steinmeier (1984b) already noted that phased retirement
would be discouraged if earnings in a year in which the individual works part-
time would be counted in determining the pension or social security benefit.
A specific financial incentive that makes gradual retirement less attractive is
an earnings test on old-age social security benefits that taxes away most of
after-tax earnings in a part-time job (cf., e.g., Zweimu¨ller 1993; Ghent and
Clark 2001). For example, the US old-age social security benefits that peo-
ple can claim between age 62 and the normal retirement age are reduced by
50% for every dollar of earnings above a given threshold, typically reducing
the marginal net wage rate of working part-time by the same 50%.
The rules of defined-benefit pension plans are often particularly restrictive.
They may, for example, prohibit workers to work for and receive a pension
from the same employer at the same time (Chen and Scott 2003; Forman and
Scahill 2003). Finally, health insurance may hamper phased or partial retire-
ment or job changes of older workers, particularly if the worker has a chronic
health problem (Hurd 1996).
Hutchens and Grace-Martin (2004) showed that restrictions on phased
retirement perceived by white-collar workers in the US vary across industries,
and that small organizations are more likely to offer phased retirement than
larger organizations. Opportunities are largest in health, education, and social
services, but are low in the (other parts of the) public administration sec-
tor. Expanding establishments offer phased retirement more often than other
firms and unionisation reduces phased retirement possibilities (perhaps due to
lower downward wage flexibility or reluctance to reduce pension rights; see
Smolkin 1996).
Smolkin (1996) presented the results of a survey among Western European
personnel executives, asking them which problems they judged to be major
obstacles in introducing alternative work patterns, including phased retire-
ment. The results showed a close finish between several reasons, including
“hidden extra costs” (named by 32% of the respondents), “inadequate com-
mitment by top management” (31%), “production problems” (30%), “union
opposition” (30%), “human problems and reactions” (28%), “resistance by
lower- and middle-management” (28%) and “inadequate briefing/training to
show employees how to take advantage” (27%). Only 18% named “lack of
support from the workforce.”
3.2 Benefits
The literature emphasizes the benefits of partial and phased retirement for
employees and for the macro-economy as a whole, but also mentions advan-
tages for employers. For employees, gradual retirement “constitutes a way of
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avoiding the pension shock following an abrupt transition from full-time work
to full pensioning” (Reday-Mulvey and Delsen 1996). It reduces stress and
increases job satisfaction (Reday-Mulvey 2000). It gives the worker an oppor-
tunity to benefit from continued membership in a work team, while also pro-
viding the free time to develop activities outside work.
Similarly, for employers it provides a soft form of personnel reduction and
a cost-effective opportunity to retain people with valuable corporate knowl-
edge and precious skills. Employers can use partial and phased retirement as
a means to reduce adjustment costs (Ghent and Clark 2001) and to increase
productivity and reduce absenteeism by increasing job satisfaction (Reday-
Mulvey 2000). For firms with their own occupational pension fund, phased
retirement may lead to longer contribution periods if workers continue con-
tributing during phased retirement, and to lower average benefits if workers in
phased retirement receive partial pensions. Phased retirement may also help to
reduce the costs involved with worker exits through alternative exit routes, i.e.
disability or unemployment (Reday-Mulvey and Delsen 1996). Smolkin (1996)
argued that phased retirement could maintain or even enhance employee
morale because a properly promoted phased retirement programme will be
perceived as part of a natural evolution rather than a premature career
termination.
The macroeconomic benefits focus on labour force participation and the
labour supply of older workers. Wadensjo¨ (2006) distinguished three goals in
this context: decrease early exit, increase the formal retirement age (or the
minimum age for getting an old-age pension), and facilitate work after the
normal retirement age. Keeping older workers in the labour force is consid-
ered important not only for the size of the labour force, but also because
older workers are generally well-qualified and productive, so that keeping
them helps to keep productivity per worker at a high level (Mulvey 2005).
This is in stark contrast with age discrimination because older workers would
be too expensive and less productive.
4 EMPIRICIAL ANALYSIS OF GRADUAL RETIREMENT IN THE US
This section first discusses the prevalence of gradual retirement, considering
incidence, transition probabilities, sequences and durations. It then reviews the
literature on the background characteristics that are correlated with gradual
retirement, using the terminology introduced in Sect. 2.
The empirical literature in the US is based mainly upon a few surveys. The
Retirement History Study (RHS; see, for example, Irelan (1988)) interviewed
men and unmarried women aged 58–63 in 1969 in six biennial waves. The
study provided only subjective information on whether the main job offered
an opportunity for gradual retirement (Gustman and Steinmeier 1984b). The
Health and Retirement Study (HRS) is an ongoing study that began with an
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interview of the cohort aged 51–61 in 1992 and has by now seven biennial
waves. Unlike the RHS, it includes also married women. Other cohorts were
added later to the study. The RHS and HRS cover retirement, labour force
history, demographics, health, income, etc. The National Longitudinal Sur-
vey of Older Men (NLS) surveyed men aged 45–59 initially in 1966, and then
about every other year, until 1981. The topics included non-work- and work
experiences, health and health insurance, leisure time, and labour market deci-
sions (including job changes, retirement, and re-entry).
A drawback of the biennial surveys is the limited information on job- and
labour supply mobility between waves (Blau 1994). The Current Population
Survey (CPS) is a monthly survey of household members aged 15 and over,
which has been conducted for more than 50 years. Interviews include ques-
tions on labour force characteristics, such as work experience, schedules, ben-
efits and earnings, as well as demographic and institutional characteristics.
The Retirement Confidence Survey (RCS) is an annual study that began in
1991 on individuals over the age of 25, and explores saving behaviour, retire-
ment, and long-run financial security. The Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID) is a longitudinal study of a representative sample of US individuals
and their families. In recent years, special supplemental datasets were
constructed.
4.1 Incidence of Gradual Retirement
Of the employees in the HRS who had at least 10 years of tenure, 14.5% held
a bridge job in 1992. This increased to 29.3% in 1998 and then fell to 25.3%
in 2002 (Quinn et al. 2006). During the first four waves of the HRS, the share
of gradual retirees continuously rose with age, to 15% at age 64. Scott (2004)
found that in the HRS sample, phased retirement decreased from 7.5 in 1994
to 4.1, 4.2 and 1.3% in 1996, 1998 and 2000, respectively, while partial retire-
ment rose from 3.7 to 5.5, 13.4 and 15.5%.
Expectations of and interest in gradual retirement, as stated by current
employees, seem to exceed the actual gradual retirement rates. In a web survey
in 2005, 38% of employees expressed an interest in gradual retirement (Brown
2005). A 1999 AARP survey suggested that about 80% of baby boomers aged
33–52 expected to work at least part-time during their retirement, mainly
because staying at work is intrinsically interesting (35%) or because of the
extra income (23%; Roper Starch Worldwide 1999). In the 1998 RCS survey,
61% of employees expressed an interest in working after retirement, most of
them to improve the quality of their lives and some for their financial situa-
tion (Yakoboski et al. 1998; Clark and Quinn 2002).
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TABLE 1 – TRANSITIONS IN THE HRS, 1994–2000
To
Full-time Phased Partial Full
work retirement retirement retirement Total
From Full-time work 48.63 4.48 9.05 37.85 100
Phased retirement 38.00 18.80 7.73 35.47 100
Partial retirement 28.40 – 24.46 47.14 100
Full retirement 22.27 – 12.59 65.14 100
Source: (Scott, 2004, Figure 3). Sample of salaried workers in 1992; 4,721 observations. Number
of transitions in % of number in origin state. For example, on average over the four 2-year peri-
ods, 48.63% of those working full-time at a given point in time are still working full-time 2 years
later.
4.2 Transitions
Table 1 summarizes Figure 3 in Scott (2004).2 It merges transitions between
consecutive waves (1992–1994, 1994–1996, 1996–1998 and 1998–2000) in the
HRS cohort born 1931–1941 of those who were salaried workers in 1992
(4,721 individuals; 14,163 transitions). The table distinguishes four labour
market states (full-time work, partial retirement, phased retirement and full
retirement) and combines data on number of hours worked and self-reported
labour force status.3
The most common transition to a different labour market state is from
full-time work to full-time retirement (2,686 transitions). Almost 38% of all
full-time workers are fully retired in the next wave. Almost 49% are still work-
ing full-time. The others enter partial or phased retirement. Of full-time work-
ers who have stopped working full-time 2 years later, almost one of every ten
stay with the same employer with reduced work effort (phased retirement),
and almost two in ten change to another job (partial retirement). The other
seven have gone into full-time retirement.
Workers typically do not stay long in partial or phased retirement. Only
about one in every four workers observed in gradual retirement was still in
gradual retirement 2 years later. Surprisingly, many of them went back to full-
time work, particularly if they had been in phased retirement (a 38% tran-
sition rate). This makes the number of transitions from phased retirement
2 Other studies, such as Gustman and Steinmeier (2000), have shown similar transition rates,
but usually for the earlier data only and with different labour market state definitions and
samples.
3 Transitions from partial retirement or full retirement into phased retirement are not possi-
ble by construction.
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to full-time work larger than the number of transitions from phased retire-
ment to full-time retirement. Scott (2004) provides no explanation for this
unexpectedly large number of transitions back into full-time work. Similarly,
we find many transitions from full-time retirement to gradual retirement or
full-time work. Almost one in every three fully retired workers is no longer
fully retired 2 years later. Of those who returned to work, more than a third
worked fewer hours than before they retired, and are thus categorized as par-
tially retired. Measurement error might explain part of the large number of
transitions, but other research suggests that many of these “reverse transi-
tions” are real. Maestas (2007) reports that slightly less than half of all work-
ers follow a traditional retirement pattern without “reverse retirement.”
All in all, the transition matrix in Table 1 illustrates the substantial mobil-
ity in the labour market for older workers in the US. In particular, retirement
is not at all an absorbing state (in the sense that people who are once retired
never return to work), and gradual retirement is usually not held for a long
time, with many exits not only to full retirement but also back to full-time
work. In Sect. 5 we will compare this with transition patterns in European
countries.
4.3 Sequences
Sequences refer to particular retirement pathways, summarizing behaviour
over a larger part of the life cycle. Three types of sequences can be distin-
guished. The first is an instantaneous exit from career employment into retire-
ment, without gradual retirement. The second is a three-step sequence: career
job employment – gradual retirement (partial or phased) – full retirement.
The third category consists of all sequences that are non-monotonic, in the
sense that they include transitions from gradual retirement to full-time work
or from full retirement to gradual retirement (or both).
(Gustman and Steinmeier, 2000, Table 7) presented the sequences over the
6 years spanned by the first four waves of the HRS (1992–1998; cohort born
1931–1941).4 Four self-reported labour market states are distinguished: full-
time work, full retirement, gradual retirement and “not available.”5 These
sequences are incomplete, in the sense that many respondents had not yet
retired in 1998, explaining why 24.7% were continuously in full-time employ-
ment over the four waves. On the other hand, 8.0% were completely retired
in all four waves. Partial retirement occurred at least once in about 22% of
4 Blau (1994) presented an overview of sequences in the older RHS cohort, but these are
difficult to compare with those of Gustman and Steinmeier since the HRS cohort is observed
at a younger age.
5 This includes those who refused to answer or answered “don’t know” to the question on
labour market status, proxy interviews for respondents who were not able to answer the ques-
tions, and respondents who dropped out of the survey.
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all sequences. In 8.9% of all sequences, the transition pattern was monotonic
without partial retirement, with one transition from full-time work to full-
time retirement. The results also confirm the importance of reverse transi-
tions: in about 14% of all sequences, a “reverse transition” took place, from
full to partial retirement or from full- or partial retirement to full-time work.
4.4 Durations
Gustman and Steinmeier (1984a, 2000) found estimates of the average dura-
tion in gradual retirement of 2.55 years in the HRS and 2.76 years in the
older RHS data. In contrast, Sueyoshi (1989) estimated a much longer aver-
age duration using the RHS, using a different definition of gradual retire-
ment. (Sueyoshi, 1989, Table 2) found that in the RHS, direct retirees left full
employment at an average age of 64.8 years. Gradual retirees went into grad-
ual retirement at an average age of 64.7, and then fully withdrew from the
labour market at age 69.8 (on average), much later than the normal retirement
age. This suggests that gradual retirement induces many workers to remain
in the labour market for about five more years. For the OECD as a whole,
Reday-Mulvey and Delsen (1996) also reported that the period of gradual
retirement typically lasts about 5 years.
Depending on when it starts and on its duration, gradual retirement may
extend employment beyond the normal retirement age. (Scott, 2004, Table 10)
addressed the same issue in a different way. He found that (keeping age and
other variables constant) phased retirees are less likely to leave the labour
force than full-time workers, although the difference is significant only at the
11% level.
4.5 Correlates of Gradual Retirement
Several studies have analysed how preferences for phased or partial retirement
in the US vary with background variables. Gustman and Steinmeier (1984b),
Honig and Hanoch (1985) and Sueyoshi (1989) used RHS data for this anal-
ysis. Here, we focus on three studies that have used the more recent data from
the HRS.
Quinn (1996) studied transitions between the 1992 and 1994 waves of the
HRS. He considered full-time workers in 1992, and estimated a logit model
for holding a bridge job in 1994. He found that transitions to a bridge job are
significantly more likely for workers aged 63–65 and for construction work-
ers, and less likely for the self-employed, for those with the highest educa-
tion level, for home-owners, and for those who have children living with them.
He found no independent effect of health on the probability to get a bridge
job, but he did find a smaller probability to enter a bridge job for employees
who would lose their health insurance and for employees with an employer-
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provided pension plan (irrespective of whether or not they were of eligible
age). Both findings are in line with what one would expect, since losing health
insurance or the opportunity to build up an occupational pension reduces the
attractiveness of moving to another (bridge) job.
Ekerdt et al. (1996) analysed retirement plans in the HRS 1992, distin-
guishing five categories (stop working altogether, reduce effort, change job,
never stop, or having no plans) and using multinomial logit analysis. They
found that women are less likely to take gradual retirement than men. The
tendency to reduce hours rather than change jobs increases with age. Both
reducing hours and changing jobs are more prevalent for the higher than for
the lower education levels. The self-employed are more likely to reduce hours,
in line with the notion that they face fewer market restrictions. Entitlement
to a private pension increases the tendency to stop working altogether, at the
cost of all other alternatives. Being married also increases the odds to stop
working altogether.
Kim and DeVaney (2005) explored the transition from full-time work in
1992 to full-time work, gradual retirement or complete retirement in 2000.
They found that the self-employed have a higher probability of gradual retire-
ment, probably because of more flexibility in determining their own work-
ing hours. Unlike other studies, they did find a health effect: those with
more chronic conditions are more likely to reduce hours. The likelihood of
gradual retirement also rose with age and education. They found that DB
pension entitlement and investment assets increase the probability of full
retirement, but do not change the odds of gradual retirement versus
full-time work. They concluded that retirement decisions are sensitive to
financial incentives (like pension plans), which creates scope for public policy.
The findings that DB pensions make partial retirement less likely and that
the self-employed are more likely to take phased retirement are in line with
the earlier studies based upon the RHS. These findings illustrate the impor-
tance of institutional restrictions on combining a DB-pension receipt with
continued work, and employer-imposed restrictions on working part-time.
5 GRADUAL RETIREMENT IN EUROPE
Several studies have provided overviews of partial retirement arrangements in
Europe. Delsen (1996) is an early example. Describing policies in Denmark,
Finland and Sweden, he concluded that only the Swedish programme could
be called successful, in the sense of reducing the number of early withdraw-
als from the labour force. The Swedish partial-pension scheme was introduced
in 1976, with a generous partial pension in combination with work for work-
ers of 60 years and older. Several substantial changes in generosity were intro-
duced in later years. Both the government and the employers supported the
Swedish scheme, which was seen as a means of reducing labour costs dur-
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ing an economic recession. The crucial condition to make it a success was
an adequate supply of part-time jobs. This condition was met, since Swedish
firms were already familiar with organizing part-time employment and willing
to share the responsibility of society to guarantee employment to older work-
ers. An important attraction for employees is that the Swedish scheme counts
the partial pension as pensionable income so that taking up a partial pen-
sion does not affect the old age pension (Wadensjo¨ 2006, p. 31). The Swed-
ish system was abolished in 2001, but a new scheme was introduced in 2003.
The current system entitles workers older than 61 to reduce working hours
by as much as 50%, and to draw 100, 75, 50 or 25% of the full pension (Bel-
loni et al. 2006). Wadensjo¨ (2006) studied the Swedish partial-pension scheme
in detail. He exploited changes in the system to analyse its consequences for
participation and labour supply. Although he did not estimate any economet-
ric models but merely looked at the raw data, he concluded that the positive
effect of increased participation clearly outweighs the negative effect of full-
time workers reducing their hours to part-time, so that the total effect of the
partial-pension programme on labour supply is positive.
The Danish system introduced in 1987 applies to workers between the
ages of 60 and 65 satisfying some conditions concerning their past partici-
pation (and, for the self-employed, profits; see Belloni et al. 2006). They can
reduce their working hours and receive a partial pension proportional to the
reduction in working time. Although the Danish scheme was modelled after
the Swedish model, it was much less successful. Delsen (1996) argued that
this was due mainly to the unfavourable labour market at the time of its
introduction – a severe recession, with pressure on older workers to take full
rather than phased retirement.
A similar argument explains the lack of success in Finland, where a par-
tial pension scheme was introduced in 1987. The current rules allow workers
between the ages of 58 and 67 to reduce their working hours to 16–28 h per
week and replace 50% of foregone earnings by a partial pension (Belloni et
al. 2006). Other reasons why the Finnish system was not successful were that
the Finnish system is more complicated and part-time jobs were hard to find
(Delsen 1996).
Belloni et al. (2006) also describes gradual retirement arrangements in
Spain (existing since the 1960s), France (since 1988) and Germany (since
1992). These systems all allow workers of age 60 or 61 and older to reduce
working time and receive a corresponding partial pension (conditional on
having contributed a long enough time to the social security system). Accord-
ing to Reday-Mulvey (2000), it seems that the programmes in France and
Germany were successful as a substitute for very generous schemes of early
complete retirement. She emphasizes the key role of training older workers,
which is commonly done in Sweden and in the larger companies in France.
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The countries discussed above are the only countries that have an explicit
arrangement for combining part-time work with a part-time pension, but
Reday-Mulvey (2000) found that most EU countries have introduced schemes
that make it possible to combine work and pension receipt. The situation in the
Netherlands is rather complicated, due to the variety of occupational pension
schemes with their own rules. (Belloni et al., 2006, p.12) stated that “some of
these schemes allow workers at the end of their careers to reduce their work-
ing hours and receive a partial pension.”6 Delsen (1996) also described some
tendencies toward partial retirement opportunities in the Netherlands, which
he identified as a promising way to cope with the problem of ageing, raising
the effective retirement age and easing future fiscal problems.
Morris and Mallier (2003) analysed the importance of part-time work and
self-employment among older age groups for the EU-15. They found that
in many countries, part-time work among men is much more prevalent at
ages 60–64 and 65–69 than at earlier ages, although there is huge variation
across countries. In particular, in the Northern part of Europe, part-time
work among men is common, while in the Southern European countries, self-
employment is more prevalent.
5.1 Part-time Work in Europe
Whether employees in European countries prefer to reduce their work effort
as they age can be inferred from comparing part-time employment rates
among younger and older workers. Although part-time workers are not
always in gradual retirement, this will still give an impression of how many
older workers reduce their working hours toward the end of their career. The
data used here were drawn from the European Community Household Panel,
a panel dataset following individuals aged 16 and over from 1994 to 2001.7
Table 2 presents the shares of part-time workers among all workers (work-
ing either part-time or full-time) for men and women in two age categories,
35–50 and 51–65, and for the years 1994, 1998 and 2001. Part-time status is
determined by the subjective question “Did you work full-time or part-time?”
In almost all cases, part-time employment is more prevalent in the older age
category than in the younger category, suggesting that workers reduce their
work effort later in life. In many countries, the proportions of part-time work-
ers decline over time, particularly for males. We therefore find no evidence
that gradual retirement becomes increasingly prevalent over this time period.
There is huge variation in the prevalence of part-time work across countries,
for both sexes and in both age groups. In the Netherlands, part-time work
6 On p. 22, Belloni et al. (2006) have replaced “some” by “many”.
7 See Peracchi (2002) for more information on ECHP.
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TABLE 2 – PART-TIME WORK OF TOTAL EMPLOYMENT (%)
1994 1998 2001
35–50 51–65 35–50 51–65 35–50 51–65
Men
Germany 2.1 7.3 2.3 8.6 2.8 2.8
Denmark 2.5 6.8 2.4 8.0 2.1 4.8
Netherlands 4.6 13.4 5.3 11.6 5.7 10.4
Belgium 2.3 6.9 1.7 5.2 0.8 (5.1)
France 5.8 9.4 1.3 (3.9) 1.3 3.6
UK 5.1 8.9 2.5 6.4 2.5 4.8
Ireland 5.3 8.8 5.7 12.0 5.3 11.9
Italy 5.9 10.4 2.1 5.7 1.6 4.1
Greece 6.6 9.0 2.1 2.6 1.2 2.8
Spain 3.7 6.5 1.9 3.4 2.2 2.9
Portugal 3.0 9.0 1.3 6.8 1.1 5.3
Austria 0.7 3.5 1.8 (4.2) 1.9 5.8
Finland 3.3 8.5 3.2 9.0 3.1 7.5
Sweden 2.3 6.4 1.7 6.2 1.5 4.6
Women
Germany 37.9 39.7 32.5 37.1 30.0 33.4
Denmark 19.4 37.3 16.9 28.6 14.7 28.6
Netherlands 63.8 68.3 63.2 64 61.6 60.4
Belgium 28.6 32.3 30.8 29.4 32.6 35.1
France 23.3 27.8 17.0 19.7 14.3 20.3
UK 43.7 45.3 15.8 23.7 14.0 26.0
Ireland 46.4 42.6 44.6 55.5 40.3 46.3
Italy 26.2 29.9 12.4 11.1 13.3 10.6
Greece 17.0 21.6 9.6 18.9 7.6 17.4
Spain 21.5 23.4 16.2 24.1 19.7 22.4
Portugal 12.5 25.6 11.7 24.8 10.8 25.2
Austria 27.6 (25.9) 29.3 31.5 30.6 27.5
Finland 8.6 12.8 9.1 15.7 8.0 17.3
Sweden 15.9 22.0 16.8 20.2 13.0 19.4
Notes: 1. Based upon self-assessed labour market status. 2. For Germany, Sweden and the
UK, the presented numbers are from national surveys converted into the ECHP format. 3. The
numbers in italics refer to the closest survey year that data is available: for Austria it is 1995, for
Finland it is 1996, and for Sweden it is 1997. The numbers in parentheses indicate that data are
missing for various ages within the age category. 4. The sample is weighted.
among older men and among women in both age groups is much higher than
in most other countries.
Table 3 defines part-time as working 1–34 h per week. Again, there is no
clear time trend. In comparison to Table 2, the preference for reduced labour
in the late working life is even more pronounced, particularly among men.
Table 3 also contains the US, with data drawn from the Panel Study of
Income Dynamics (PSID) (Since the PSID has no self-assessed part-time sta-
tus, the US could not be included in Table 2). It shows that part-time work
among women is less common in the US than in Europe for both age groups.
The figures for men are comparable to those in Europe.
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TABLE 3 – WORKING 1–34 h PER WEEK (%)
1994 1998 2001
35–50 51–65 35–50 51–65 35–50 51–65
Men
Germany 2.6 6.3 4.6 9.8 3.7 6.7
Denmark 3.1 6.7 2.7 8.6 3.4 5.8
Netherlands 7.3 14.0 10.0 17.5 11.6 17.0
Belgium 3.7 6.6 3.5 10.9 3.7 (8.7)
France 6.3 9.3 4.3 (6.8) 4.8 6.3
UK 3.5 10.5 3.7 9.6 4.3 7.7
Ireland 7.1 11.0 9.3 19.2 9.4 18.9
Italy 6.6 10.4 5.1 11.0 4.9 8.5
Greece 8.4 10.2 7.2 11.5 6.8 9.4
Spain 5.3 7.3 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.6
Portugal 3.8 9.4 1.9 7.6 1.6 7.1
Austria 2.2 3.0 2.8 (3.7) 2.6 7.2
Finland 6.2 12.1 6.9 12.8 4.5 12.1
Sweden 3.5 10.8 3.4 9.0 3.6 7.2
US 5.6 12.9 4.8 8.9 4.1 8.4
Women
Germany 42.2 45.0 44.1 50.3 44.1 46.7
Denmark 30.4 50.6 33.1 40.8 30.5 46.1
NL 75.1 75.5 77.9 75.4 76.0 79.1
Belgium 36.3 39.3 41.6 36.9 45.5 47.5
France 30.1 30.8 32.3 31.1 29.2 29.7
UK 50.2 58.5 48.1 54.2 44.7 56.5
Ireland 54.5 49.4 57.0 69.3 57.2 60.9
Italy 30.0 35.6 31.6 33.1 32.1 34.9
Greece 22.9 31.7 23.0 37.6 21.0 39.3
Spain 27.9 29.8 23.8 34.0 29.1 32.4
Portugal 16.4 32.2 16.4 32.8 15.5 32.9
Austria 38.8 (32.9) 41.0 35.6 41.0 35.5
Finland 15.6 14.9 16.7 19.5 16.5 21.0
Sweden 33.5 38.3 37.2 36.8 33.1 33.9
US 18.6 25.8 15.4 18.7 14.5 19.8
Notes: 1. For Germany, Sweden and the UK the presented numbers are from national surveys
converted into the ECHP format. 2. The ECHP sample is weighted. 3. The US numbers are from
the PSID. The sample is not weighted. 4. The numbers in italic refer to the closest survey year
that data is available: for Austria it is 1995, for Finland 1996, for Sweden 1997, and for the US
2000. The numbers in parentheses indicate that data are missing for various ages within the age
category.
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TABLE 4 – TWO-YEAR TRANSITION RATES 1994–2000 (%)
FF FP FO PF PP PO OF OP OO
35–50Years Old
Austria 94.2 3.1 2.8 14.8 76.9 8.3 8.4 13.4 78.2
Finland 92.7 4.1 3.2 36.8 45.2 18.0 26.6 10.7 62.8
Denmark 92.8 4.3 2.9 21.3 69.4 9.3 24.8 13.9 61.3
Netherlands 91.8 5.8 2.3 9.6 83.8 6.7 5.8 16.7 77.5
Belgium 91.9 5.0 3.1 17.1 75.4 7.5 5.5 6.3 88.2
France 91.9 3.7 4.5 19.0 66.5 14.5 11.9 6.9 81.2
Ireland 90.1 5.6 4.3 16.5 68.2 15.3 8.3 17.3 74.4
Italy 92.2 3.6 4.2 23.8 66.0 10.1 6.7 4.6 88.7
Greece 88.8 5.1 6.0 32.0 52.3 15.6 11.9 5.6 82.5
Spain 89.2 3.8 7.0 37.3 40.3 22.4 13.0 4.8 82.2
Portugal 92.0 2.9 5.2 37.2 52.4 10.3 17.6 8.6 73.9
Germany 91.4 3.7 4.9 18.2 73.6 8.2 15.9 13.4 70.7
UK 91.4 4.7 3.9 18.2 72.2 9.6 10.5 12.9 76.6
US 94.6 3.5 1.8 52.2 37.4 10.2 19.6 11.8 68.5
51–65Years Old
Austria 71.2 2.2 26.6 13.9 56.8 29.4 0.9 1.2 97.9
Finland 75.7 7.4 17.0 14.2 49.1 36.7 2.0 2.3 95.7
Denmark 79.4 6.3 14.5 9.5 60.3 30.2 2.7 3.5 93.7
Netherlands 74.9 9.7 15.4 7.0 71.1 21.9 1.0 2.6 96.4
Belgium 73.9 6.0 20.2 9.7 54.8 35.5 0.4 0.9 98.7
France 74.1 4.4 21.5 11.2 51.0 37.7 1.2 0.9 97.9
Ireland 78.5 8.9 12.6 19.1 57.2 23.7 1.8 6.6 91.6
Italy 72.9 4.1 22.9 14.7 50.9 34.4 1.4 1.0 97.7
Greece 70.1 8.3 21.6 29.3 36.2 34.5 2.9 2.3 94.8
Spain 74.3 3.7 22.0 21.8 40.9 37.3 2.4 1.7 95.9
Portugal 76.6 7.7 15.7 20.2 49.6 30.2 3.9 4.4 91.6
Germany 74.5 4.8 20.7 10.4 61.1 28.4 1.7 2.4 95.9
UK 78.5 6.6 14.9 7.9 66.4 25.8 1.9 3.0 95.0
US 85.4 6.5 9.4 23.0 54.5 22.4 4.0 3.5 92.4
Notes: 1. ‘F’ refers to full-time work, ‘P’ to part-time work, and ‘O’ to other (not working). In
the PSID the ‘other’ category refers to “did not work for money now or did not work at all” and
in the ECHP it refers to “unemployed, discouraged worker, or economically inactive”. 2. Full-
time and part-time work definitions are based on actual work hours. Part-time work is 1–34 h of
work per week. 3. The table is based on survey units which are traceable through all four waves.
4. The numbers for Austria and Finland are over the last three biennial waves, 1996–2000, due to
missing data for 1994. For Germany and the UK the numbers are from national surveys (GSOEP
and BHPS) converted to the ECHP format. 5. The ECHP sample is weighted.
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In the previous section, we discussed the remarkably large number of
reverse retirement transitions in the US, from gradual retirement back to
full-time work, or from full retirement back to full-time or part-time work.
Although we cannot use Scott’s labour force status definitions for Europe
to compare this type of mobility in Europe and the US, comparing ECHP
and PSID as in Table 3 gives the possibility for a comparison of mobility
based upon working hours only. Average 2-year transition rates for 1994–
2000 between full-time work, part-time work and no work, the same classi-
fication as in Table 1, are presented in Table 4. The table reveals many dif-
ferences across countries. The Netherlands stands out as the country where
part-time work is most persistent, among both the younger and the older age
group. In general, for the age group 51–65, reverse transition rates for the US
are among the largest, although not completely out of line with the Euro-
pean transition rates. This suggests that reverse transitions also deserve more
attention in many European countries. For example, it would be worthwhile
to investigate the extent to which such transitions are anticipated, or are a
reaction to an unexpectedly low replacement rate (cf. Maestas 2007).
6 GRADUAL RETIREMENT IN THE NETHERLANDS
Figures 1–3 illustrate the potential relevance of gradual retirement in the
Netherlands. Figure 1 shows the development over the period 1987 until 2006
of employment rates for men and women, for the age groups 35–50 and
51–65 (where only people who work 12 h per week or more are counted as
employed). The employment rate among prime age men has been rather sta-
ble at around 90%. The employment rate of the older part of the male labour
force has increased substantially around the turn of the century and has stabi-
lized at about 60% since then. For prime age women, employment rates have
increased substantially until about 2001 and seem to have stabilized since,
while the employment rate among women in the age group 51–65 continued
to increase. Both figures suggest that a policy of increasing employment has
more promise for the older part of the labour force than for the prime age
groups.
Figure 2 presents the fraction of part-time workers (working 1–34 hours)
among all workers. For men aged 51–65, this percentage has increased a few
percentage points around 2000, whereas it has remained stable for men aged
35–50. The larger rates for older men suggest that a substantial number of
men reduce their hours when approaching retirement age. For women, part-
time work is hardly more common among the older than among the youn-
ger ages. The increasing rates among younger women may be related to the
increase in participation (Figure 1) – much of this is in the form of part-time
work.
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Figure 1 – Employment Rates. Source: Enquete Beroepsbevolking, Statistics Netherlands; 80,000
to 120,000 observations for each cross section. The variable is not available for the year 1991.
Observations are weighted with cross sectional weights. The percentages represent the share of
working population in the total of those working, unemployed or not belonging to the labour
force
It is interesting to compare Figures 2 with Figure 3, presenting the percent-
age that would want to work part-time. Particularly for men aged 51–65, this
percentage has increased substantially over the past decade and exceeds by
far the percentage of men who actually work 1–34 h. This suggests that many
older men would like to reduce their work hours and take some form of grad-
ual retirement, but for some reason are not able to do this.
This discussion makes clear that both limitations imposed by employers
or institutions and preferences of the workers are important determinants of
gradual retirement. In the remainder of this section, we consider both.
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Figure 2 – Employees working 1–34 h. Source: Enquete Beroepsbevolking, Statistics Nether-
lands; about 60,000 obervations for each cross section. Observations are weighted with cross
sectional weights. The percentages represent the share of those working 1–34 h in those working
any number of hours
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Figure 3 – Employees desiring to work 1–34 h. Source: Enquete Beroepsbevolking, Statistics
Netherlands; 5,000 to 9,000 observations for each cross section. Observations are weighted with
cross sectional weights. The variable is not available for 2000 and before 1991. The percentages
represent the share of those who desire to work 1–34 h in those who desire to work any number
of hours
6.1 Legal Issues
Ceelen (2007) considers legal issues that restrict access to gradual retirement.
The general conclusion of his analysis: although no major legal obstacles
seem to exist, some fine-tuning is still required, particularly concerning taxa-
tion. Specific issues arise if gradual retirement is combined with another tax-
favoured arrangement, the so-called life-course scheme. Ceelen recommended
more transparency of the tax treatment in such cases. Other issues arise with
working after age 65. For example, not all pension funds allow for accumulat-
ing pension entitlements after age 65. Moreover, the obligation to pay wages
for two years if the employee becomes ill may be an impediment for employ-
ers. Thus there is some scope for specific policies for workers aged 65 and
older.
6.2 Employer Attitudes
In March 2007, we fielded a survey focusing on opportunities provided by
and restrictions imposed on phased retirement. Employees older than 25 years
of age in the CentERpanel (a representative panel of the Dutch adult popu-
lation, see www.centerdata.nl) were asked how they perceived the possibilities
for phased retirement at their current employer. The sample has 815 observa-
tions. The first question in the module on phased retirement was as follows:
“Does your employer offer you the possibility of part-time retirement?
(Part-time retirement means that you retire part of your working week
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TABLE 5 – ESTIMATION RESULTS
Explanatory variable LOGIT OLS
Access to phased retirement Age of phased retirement
Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value
Men −0.13 (−0.60) 0.47 (1.33)
Children 1+ 0.20 (1.00) 0.90 (2.26)
Partner 0.14 (0.63) 0.40 (0.81)
Age 35–44 −0.18 (−0.73) 0.93 (1.85)
Age 45–54 0.16 (0.68) 1.72 (3.41)
Age 55+ −0.07 (−0.25) 1.99 (3.49)
Education mid 0.02 (0.07) 0.50 (0.96)
Education high 0.19 (0.77) 0.59 (1.01)
Income mid 0.37 (1.30) −0.02 (−0.03)
Income high 0.48 (1.33) −0.41 (−0.61)
Region west −0.35 (−1.27) −1.01 (−2.32)
Region north −0.12 (−0.36) −0.54 (−0.87)
Region east −0.08 (−0.28) −0.38 (−0.91)
Region south 0.00 (0.01) −1.18 (−2.40)
Sector comm. service −0.28 (−1.20) 0.19 (0.39)
Sector publ. service 0.73 (3.10) −0.12 (−0.25)
Intercept −0.68 (−1.44) 58.57 (57.68)
Notes: 1. Logit estimates: Employees ages 25–65, CentER panel, 815 observations. Dependent
variable: dummy for perceived access to phased retirement with current employer. 2. OLS esti-
mates: Employees ages 25–65, CentER panel, respondents with access to phased retirement at
current employer; 393 observations. Dependent variable: perceived age at which phased retirement
can start.
but keep working the other part—for example, from age 62 until age
65.)”
Almost half of the respondents (47.3%) of the sample answered affir-
matively. This is much higher than in Van Soest et al. (2006), who used
data from 2004 and also included retired former employees and found that
34.2% responded affirmatively. The difference cannot be explained solely
by the lower rate among retirees (who were asked about their last job as
an employee) and suggests that perceived access to phased retirement has
increased, which corresponds to the fact that large pension funds have created
transparent opportunities for partial pensions.
The left hand panel of Table 5 presents the estimates of a logit model
explaining the dummy variable that has value 1 for respondents who think
they have access to phased retirement, and 0 for those who do not think
they have access. A positive coefficient on an explanatory variable thus means
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that an increase in this variable makes access to phased retirement more
likely (although, since we only measure the employee’s perception, it might
also mean that the respondent has different information). Phased retirement
opportunities are significantly more common in the public sector than in
manufacturing or commercial services. The difference in the access probabil-
ity for an average worker in the public sector and the manufacturing sector is
about 18%-points, keeping other variables constant. Other variables are not
significant, although the income variables are jointly significant at the 10%
level, suggesting that access to phased retirement is more common among the
higher income groups.8
Employees who answered the question on access to phased retirement affir-
matively then got a follow-up question on the earliest age at which they
thought they could reduce their hours of work. The distribution of the
answers is concentrated at ages 60 and 62, with about 30% and 35% of
the (393) observations, respectively. The overall mean is 60.3 years of age.
The right hand panel of Table 5 presents the results of a linear regression
explaining this earliest age of phased retirement from background variables
(not correcting for selective access). Several variables are significant. The
expected age rises with the presence of children, which may reflect a selection
effect – respondents with children might have chosen different types of jobs.
The earliest phased retirement age also rises with the age of the respondent,
suggesting that younger cohorts are less optimistic about early phased retire-
ment. The highest age of phased retirement is reported in the three big cities.
Finally, somewhat surprisingly, no differences across sectors were found. In
general, it seems difficult to interpret these results, perhaps due to the selec-
tive nature of access to phased retirement or because variables proxy some-
thing else.
The respondents who reported not to have access to phased retirement
were asked why they think their employer does not offer such opportunities.
Each respondent was asked to assess the importance of six potential reasons,
presented in Table 6, on a five-point scale (from 1: “does not apply” to 5: “the
decisive argument”); Table 6 shows the frequency distribution of these rating.
Reasons 4 (employer wants me to continue working full time) and 1 (part-
time not attractive for my kind of work) appear to be the most important
ones. The fact that reason 4 is rated more important than reasons 5 and 6
seems to confirm that older workers are seen as valuable, with useful experi-
ence and high productivity, but some words of caution are necessary: this is
the employees’ perception of their employer’s considerations, and not directly
the view of the employers.
8 Other job characteristics that might play a role are occupation (level) and firm size, but
these are not available in the current data set.
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R1 38.9 15.1 15.3 21.8 8.7
R2 46.6 13.7 17.6 12.6 9.2
R3 38.4 24.1 24.7 7.4 5.1
R4 31.9 17.3 21.5 18.6 10.5
R5 54.2 18.5 17.1 6.7 3.3
R6 35.8 20.4 25.8 12.5 5.2
Notes: Employees ages 25–65, CentER panel, respondents without access to phased retirement at
current employer; 423 observations Rows: Reasons for not offering gradual retirement: R1: Part-
time work is not attractive for the type of work I do R2: My employer does not offer any part-
time jobs R3: My pension fund does not allow for a partial pension R4: My employer prefers
that people like me keep working full-time until normal retirement age R5: My employer pre-
fers that people like me retire completely as early as possible R6: My employer thinks the cost of
part-time workers relative to full-time workers is too high.
Table 7 presents ordered logit estimates explaining the rating of each of
the six reasons separately. The difference between men and women is larg-
est for the first reason: part-time work is not attractive for the type of work
typically done by men. This seems in accordance with the fact that women
often choose occupations where part-time work is more common and gen-
erally accepted. Men are also much more often in jobs where (at least in
the worker’s perception) employers want to keep them full-time until normal
retirement age (reason 4).
The education patterns show that workers with an intermediate level of
education differ considerably in their answers, while workers with high- and
low levels of education are more similar. Workers with intermediate educa-
tion are often skilled workers with vocational training in professions where
part-time work is not common (reason 1). They also often think reason 3 is
important: restrictions in the rules imposed by their pension funds. Perhaps
this is because they often participate in (smaller) pension funds, where rules
for phased retirement are not as generous or transparent as for large pension
funds. For high-income workers, the argument that employers want to keep
their workers full-time is relatively important (reason 4), but they also attach
significantly more weight to reasons 1 and 3, which both refer to the nature
of their work.
The only significant difference across regions is that workers in the north-
ern provinces more often have the impression that their employer wants to
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nificant differences across the three sectors. Several reasons are much less
important in the public sector than in the manufacturing industry. The
most important reason is that employers simply do not offer part-time jobs
(reason 2) – part-time work is much more common in the public sector than
elsewhere.
6.3 Preferences for Gradual Retirement and Labour Supply
Van Soest et al. (2006) used a stated-preference technique to estimate gradual
retirement preferences of the Dutch. They presented hypothetical retirement
scenarios to a sample of workers and former workers aged 25 and over, and
asked them to rate each of these scenarios on a scale from one to ten. An
example of such a scenario is as follows:




Working 23 h per week, after-tax
income is 100% of earnings at
age 65.
Not working, net pension income is
90% of after-tax earnings at age 65.
This scenario has gradual retirement from age 65 until age 70. An intro-
ductory text asked the respondent to assume that the employer fully coop-
erates, so that the scenario refers to phased rather than partial retirement.
The replacement rates during phased retirement and after full retirement
are randomized. Respondents rated eight scenarios, with and without grad-
ual retirement and with varying replacement rates and (gradual) retirement
ages.
The differences between the average ratings give a first impression of peo-
ple’s preferences. For example, the scenario presented above has an aver-
age rating of 4.0, compared to 4.8 for the benchmark scenario – full-time
work until age 65 and complete retirement thereafter with a 70% replace-
ment rate. This suggests that people on average dislike working after age
65, even part-time, in spite of the compensation in the form of a higher
income after age 65. Higher average ratings are given for scenarios of gradual
retirement centring at age 65 (gradual retirement at age 63; full retirement at
age 67).
Van Soest et al. (2006) used these ratings to estimate an intertemporal
model explaining retirement choices. Table 8 reproduces some of their results,
giving the average probabilities that a hypothetical scenario is rated higher
than the benchmark (no gradual retirement; full retirement at age 65 with
replacement rate 70%). The table shows that hardly anyone would be inter-
ested in working full-time until age 70, even if the replacement rate were
100%. Early retirement, on the other hand, is much more attractive, partic-
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TABLE 8 – SIMULATED CHOICE PROBABILITIES: ALTERNATIVES TO THE BENCH-
MARK
Scenario Partial retirement Full retirement Probability
Age % Income Age % Income
1: Postponed retirement – 70 90 0.04
2: Postponed retirement – 70 100 0.13
3: Early retirement 62 60 68.21
4: Early retirement 62 50 11.32
5: Partial retirement 63 85 67 70 66.34
6: Partial retirement 63 100 67 70 77.79
7: Partial retirement 63 85 67 80 91.30
8: Late partial retirement 65 90 70 90 20.12
9: Late partial retirement 65 100 70 100 47.16
10: Early partial retirement 60 75 65 60 69.17
Source: (Van Soest et al., 2006, Table 6) Note: “Probability” is the probability that the given sce-
nario is preferred to the benchmark, which is full retirement at age 65 for a 70% net pension.
Simulated probabilities assume no optimization error.
ularly for a high (and actuarially unfair) replacement rate of 60%. Phased
retirement can be made attractive with a high replacement rate after full
retirement.
Van Soest et al. (2006) also used their model to simulate choices between
early retirement, late retirement, and a scenario involving phased retirement,
with hours equal to 60% of pre-retirement working hours during the phased
retirement period. They found that 67% would prefer early retirement, and
33% would prefer late retirement if no partial retirement option were avail-
able. With partial retirement as a third option, their simulations suggested
that 43% would have chosen partial retirement, 38% would have chosen early
retirement, and 19% would have chosen late retirement. Total labour supply
would increase substantially. Though this outcome depends on many factors
(such as the generosity of the hypothetical gradual retirement scheme), it does
illustrate the potential of gradual retirement as a tool to increase the labour
supply of older people.
Bruinshoofd and Grob (2005) also found that the Dutch are willing to
work part-time beyond the normal retirement age (65 years). They analyse
a survey question on whether people are willing to work after age 65,
without losing their old-age state pension (AOW). While only 2% of the
respondents answer “yes, full-time,” 32% say “yes, part-time.” The others
answer “no” (57%) or “do not know” (9%). This question does not spec-
ify the financial compensation for working longer, but other results in the
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same study imply that retirement decisions are quite sensitive to financial
incentives.
7 CONCLUSIONS
While the descriptive evidence of the prevalence, nature and duration of grad-
ual retirement is abundant for the US, gradual retirement is much less stud-
ied in Europe. Part-time work is generally more common among older than
among younger workers, but there is substantial variation across countries
that remains to be analysed and explained. There is some evidence that finan-
cial incentives stimulating gradual retirement will work, but there is scope for
incorporating gradual retirement in more rigorous quantitative studies based
upon structural models on retirement decisions, like, e.g., Stock and Wise
(1990); Gustman and Steinmeier (1986); Blau (1994), or Rust and Phelan
(1997). The quantitative impact of policy measures thus remains largely to
be determined. Whether they give the same results in different countries also
remains to be seen, given the many differences in the institutional settings
(e.g. DC and DB pensions, health insurance, housing markets, borrowing
constraints, etc.). Data on stated preferences can be a useful tool to dis-
entangle workers’ preferences from limitations imposed by employers and
institutions. In addition, richer data on actual opportunities and choices are
becoming available, for example in the form of register data from the Dutch
pension funds.
In Europe and the US, gradual retirement is generally seen as an oppor-
tunity to keep older workers longer in the labour market. The few studies
that make the quantitative trade-off of the negative- and positive labour sup-
ply effects unambiguously conclude that the positive effects dominate: cre-
ating more opportunities for gradual retirement can lead to an increase in
total labour supply. This makes facilitating gradual retirement attractive from
a public policy point of view. The evidence of the effect of gradual retire-
ment on productivity is scarce, but the qualitative conclusions point in the
same direction: the older workers who are kept in the labour force are typ-
ically well motivated, highly skilled and productive. Gradual retirement can
also prevent labour market exit through alternative routes, i.e. unemploy-
ment and disability, which is particularly relevant in the Dutch context (see,
e.g., Van Vuren and Van Vuuren 2007), particularly if (very) early retirement
arrangements are abolished. For workers, the main advantage is a smooth
transition to the next stage of life, and an escape from the choice between
two inferior options: continuing in a stressful career job with the risk of
work disability or full retirement with its negative financial and social con-
sequences. For employers, there seem to be advantages and disadvantages,
and not all employers are as yet convinced that gradual retirement should be
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stimulated. However employers seem to realize increasingly that older work-
ers offer valuable experience, can guarantee continuity, and can contribute
to the corporate spirit. These advantages may outweigh such potential dis-
advantages as fixed costs of work and problems in organizing part-time job
schedules.
Still, take-up of gradual retirement is rather low in most European coun-
tries. Where the mobility in the US labour market accommodates older work-
ers who want to leave their career job to take up a bridge job as a form of
partial retirement, this is much less the case in the Netherlands and other
European countries. Here phased retirement seems the best option, creating
opportunities for part-time work without changing employer.
In addition to (perceived) disadvantages on the employers’ side, institu-
tional restrictions imposed by the government or providers of pension plans
seem to play a role. Macroeconomic circumstances also matter – gradual
retirement is less accepted in times of recession – and policies that jointly con-
sider several exit routes (early retirement, disability, unemployment) are prob-
ably preferable. There is room for less stringent rules on combining work with
partial-pension receipt, and for more transparency of these rules. In addi-
tion, the government can stimulate gradual retirement through transparent
tax measures that make gradual retirement more attractive for workers and
less expensive for employers. The existing evidence suggests that in the Neth-
erlands, tax favoured arrangements will work – the decision to take up grad-
ual retirement or not is sensitive to financial incentives, like the decision to
apply for disability insurance (Van Vuren and Van Vuuren 2007) or the deci-
sion to retire (Kapteyn and De Vos 1998). In particular, it seems important
to ensure that staying in the labour market as a part-time worker is rewarded
in the form of a higher old age pension.
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